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The Doxastic Practice Approach 
We have thus far considered two different versions of the parity 
thesis. Neither of them is successful, or so I have argued. There is a 
third possibility, however, one that emerges from some claims in 
Alston's "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology." My 
goals in this chapter are to explain Alston's doxastic practice ap­
proach, to explain the parity thesis that emerges from that ap­
proach, and to show how the background belief challenge applies 
to it. This is the last of the parity theses I mine out of Alston's 
work. 
I. A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology 
In the essay in question, Alston suggests a second approach to 
the issue of being justified in a belief that a practice is reliable. He 
distinguishes between metaepistemology and substantive episte­
mology. The former is "a view about epistemology, its nature, 
conduct, methodology, and prospects-rather than a position de­
veloped in the prosecution of the discipline itself."' The latter is the 
doing of epistemology proper-the discovery of epistemic prac­
tices, exploring how they are structured, what the criteria of justi-
I. Alston, "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology," in Knowledge 
and Skepticism, ed. M. Clay and K. Lehrer (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 
p. 24. 
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fication or rationality are, and so forth. The distinction is impor­
tant for my argument, for one cannot decide about the viability of 
the parity thesis without understanding the connections between 
epistemic justification and reliability, and one cannot understand 
these connections without understanding at what level one's ques­
tions about them arise. 
So, in "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach," a metaepistemological 
essay, Alston gives an account of the rationality of engaging in an 
epistemic practice with an eye on the issue of whether an epistemic 
practice is reliable. This contrasts with the epistemological essay, 
"Epistemic Circularity," in which Alston defends, using the more 
direct approach considered in Chapter 4, the thesis that one can be 
justified in believing that a practice is reliable. How do these ap­
proaches fit together? The burden of this section is to outline Al­
ston's argument in "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach" with a view 
to explaining how that argument impinges on the conclusions of 
"Epistemic Circularity."  In particular, I aim at spelling out the 
connections Alston thinks there are among rationality, justifica­
tion, and reliability, for we cannot get clear about the final version 
of Alston's parity thesis unless we are clear about these connec­
tions. 
The central question of" A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach" is how 
one is to determine which, if any, epistemic principles are adequate 
or, in other words, what it takes to be justified in accepting a prin­
ciple of justification. That, of course, depends on what justification 
is. Alston works here with the truth-conducive account discussed 
in Chapter 4· Given this account, to show that a principle is accept­
able one must show that it specifies a reliable mode of belief forma­
tion. But to do this is to rely, at some point, on a circular argu­
ment, since every mode of belief formation belongs to a basic 
practice. As we have seen in "Epistemic Circularity," Alston ar­
gues that not all circular arguments are logically so and in particu­
lar argues that one kind of circular argument can lend support to 
beliefs about reliability. In short, "epistemic circularity does nQt 
prevent one from showing, on the basis of empirical premises that 
are ultimately based on sense perception [where sense perception is 
his example of an epistemic practice], that sense perception is reli­
able." The problem with this, as he puts it, is that "whether one 
actually does succeed in this depends on one's being justified in 
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those perceptual premises, and that in turn, according to our as­
sumptions about justification, depends on sense perception being a 
reliable source of belief. In other words, if (and only if) sense per­
ception is reliable, we can show it to be reliable. But how can we 
cancel out that if?"2 
The problem, otherwise stated, is that, given this approach to 
justifying reliability beliefs, any belief-forming mechanism or prac­
tice can be validated, on certain assumptions: 
If all else fails, we can simply use each belief twice over, once as 
testee and once as tester. Consider crystal ball gazing. Gazing into 
the crystal ball, the seer makes a series of pronouncements: p, q, r, 
s .... Is this a reliable mode of belief-formation? Yes. That can be 
shown as follows. The gazer forms the belief that p, and, using the 
same procedure, ascertains that p. By running through a series of be­
liefs in this way, we discover that the accuracy of this mode of be­
lief-formation is 100%! . . . Thus, if we allow the use of mode of 
belief-formation M to determine whether the beliefs formed by M 
are true, M is sure to get a clean bill of health. But a line of argu­
ment that will validate any mode of belief-formation, no matter 
how irresponsible, is not what we are looking for. We want, and 
need, something much more discriminating. 3 
This "retesting" approach for showing a practice reliable appears 
to be what Alston advocates in "Epistemic Circularity," although 
there he fills in the details of how the argument might go. If I am 
correct about this, then Alston is between a rock and a hard place. 
On the rocky side, he has to show why my suggestions about the 
unavailability of the retesting for CP do not vitiate the skeptical 
claim that all practices have "trivial self-support" (as Alston later 
calls it) and therefore why we should not use the retesting ap­
proach to evaluate a practice's reliability. On my account, PP turns 
out to be epistemically superior to CP. In other words, even given 
the antecedent assumption of reliability needed for the soundness 
of the argument (to the conclusion that a practice is reliable and 
hence justifiably engaged in), there are some practices for which 
trivial self-support is not forthcoming. CP is one such practice. 
But Alston rejects the possibility of using the retesting approach to 
2. Ibid., p. 3· 
J. Ibid. 
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the end of showing a belief in reliability justified. He instead claims 
that all practices appear to have this trivial self-support, and thus 
that we need some other way of adjudicating between practices in 
terms of their reliability. 
Which brings us to the hard place: PT As appears to be trivially 
true. If all practices can be shown to be reliable via this trivial self­
support, then not only is PT As true, but a parity thesis stating that 
all practices have J.; is true. This is obviously not the case, as Al­
ston clearly assumes in the essay under consideration. Neverthe­
less, let Alston's point stand, and let us see how he makes out his 
case in answering the question he sets before us: how are we to 
adjudicate among epistemic practices in terms of their reliability? I 
return to this rocky terrain in the next section. 
What is the doxastic practice approach? Alston relies on the 
work of Wittgenstein (stripped of its verificationist assumptions) 
and Reid to help him out. Several aspects of their thought are help­
ful. First, "we engage in a plurality of doxastic practices, each with 
its own sources of belief, its own conditions of justification, its 
own fundamental beliefs, and, in some cases, its own subject mat­
ter, its own conceptual framework, and its own repertoire of pos­
sible "overriders. "' These practices, although distinct, are not 
wholly independent and are engaged in together rather than sep­
arately. Furthermore there are "generational" and "transforma­
tional" practices, the former producing beliefs from nondoxastic 
inputs, the latter transforming belief inputs into other beliefs. Each 
of the generational practices has its own distinctive subject matter 
and conceptual scheme. Second, "these practices are acquired and 
engaged in well before one is explicitly aware of them and critically 
reflects on them." Practice thus precedes theory: first we must 
learn to engage in a practice, and only then can we reflect on its 
nature. Third, practices of belief formation develop in the context 
of wider spheres of practice. For example, "we learn to form per­
ceptual beliefs along with, and as a part of, learning to deal with 
perceived objects in the pursuit of our ends." Finally, "these prac­
tices are thoroughly social: socially established by socially mon­
itored learning, and socially shared. "4 
So far, says Alston, this is just cognitive social psychology. 
4· Ibid., pp. s-s. 
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What has this to do with epistemology? Here he shifts to an indi­
rect approach. Rather than asking how psychology helps us deter­
mine which epistemic practices are reliable-in other words, a 
question about epistemic justification-he asks what resources the 
approach gives us for determining whether a given practice is ratio­
nally accepted or engaged in. 
There are, says Alston, two positions one might take on the 
connection between psychology and epistemology. The first, "au­
tonomism," "holds that epistemology is autonomous vis-a-vis psy­
chology and other sciences dealing with cognition. It holds that 
epistemology is essentially a normative or evaluative enterprise, 
and that here as elsewhere values are not determined by fact." The 
difficulty with this position is just that there appear to be no nonar­
bitrary standards by which to carry out an evaluation of epistemic 
practices. To evaluate epistemic practices one must engage in 
them. According to "heteronomism," in contrast, "if the epis­
temologist is to escape such arbitrariness, he must content himself 
with delineating the contours of established doxastic practices, per­
haps neating them up a bit and rendering them more internally 
coherent and more consonant with each other. He must give up 
pretensions to an Archimedean point from which he can carry out 
an impartial evaluation of all practices. "5 There is, then, an antin­
omy between autonomism and heteronomism. 
Alston's solution to the antinomy is twofold. First, he notes that 
neither side does full justice to epistemology. Autonomism has the 
difficulties already noted and is forced to recognize that the attrac­
tiveness of certain principles lies simply in the fact that we learned 
to engage in practices in which those principles are embedded and 
we did so before reflecting on the practices. On the other side, the 
heteronomist fails to recognize that to relegate epistemology to a 
corner where its only task is to tidy up its principles is to overlook 
the nature of epistemology as a philosophical enterprise, an enter­
prise that asks general questions. Second, he distinguishes between 
"a more or less tightly structured practice with more or less fixed 
rules, criteria, and standards, on the one hand, and a relatively free, 
unstructured "improvisational" activity on the other." The former 
1s more or less narrowly confined by antecedent rules and pro-
s. Ibid., pp. IO-I I. 
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cedures that constitute the practice (although not everything is in­
variable). The latter calls for an exercise of "judgment" that relies 
on "no established rules or criteria [that] put tight constraints on 
what judgment is to be made in a particular situation." Philosophy 
falls on the second side of the contrast and so the resolution to the 
antinomy is as follows: 
The epistemologist, in seeking to carry out a rational evaluation of 
one or another doxastic practice, is not working within a particular 
such practice. Nor need she be proposing to establish a novel prac­
tice, the specifications of which she has drawn up herself in her 
study. On the other hand, she need not abjure everything, or any­
thing, she has learned from the various practices she has mastered. 
She makes use of her doxastic skills and tendencies, not by follow­
ing the relatively fixed rules and procedures of some particular prac­
tice, but by using all this in a freer fashion. 6 
Thus, the doxastic practice approach to epistemology recognizes 
the importance of what we learn at our mother's knee but also 
the value of critical reflection on what we learn. This leaves un­
answered the question with which Alston set out: how can we go 
about justifying epistemic practices as reliable? We cannot establish 
reliability for one practice without establishing it for all. But if we 
shift the question to, what is the rational attitude toward epistemic 
practices? some progress can be made. Rejecting the view that radi­
cal skepticism with regard to epistemic practices is viable, Alston 
notes that we can take all socially established practices to be prima 
facie rational; that is, we can take all socially established practices as 
"rationally engaged in, pending sufficient reasons to take any of 
them as unreliable, and pending any other sufficient disqualifying 
considerations, if any. "7 Why limit the scope to the socially estab­
lished rather than opening it to all practices? Simply put, eccentric 
practices such as Cedric's consultation of sun-dried tomatoes as an 
indicator of stock market activity do not have a track record. Only 
when a doxastic practice has persisted over many generations does 
it earn the right to be considered seriously. There is a presumption 
in favor of socially established practices which idiosyncratic prac­
tices do not have. 
6. Ibid., pp. 12-14. 
7· Ibid., p. 16. 
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If we are to evaluate practices then, we have to do it in terms of 
a negative approach. Which practices disqualify themselves? That 
depends on the kinds of considerations taken into account as po­
tential disqualifiers. Alston suggests three. First, a practice can be 
disqualified by "persistent and irremediable inconsistency in its 
output." This counts as a disqualifier because massive inconsis­
tency is a sure indicator of significant falsehood in one's set of be­
liefs. Second, a massive and persistent inconsistency between the 
outputs of two practices indicates that at least one of them is 
faulty. Alston suggests that we follow a conservative route at this 
point, taking the more firmly established practice over the less. His 
reason? It seems to him to be "the only principle that . . .  [is] both 
unchauvinistic and eminently plausible. "8 
Alston's final suggestion "has to do not with a ground for defini­
tive rejection, but with something that will strengthen or weaken 
the prima facie acceptability. The point is this. A practice's claim to 
acceptance is strengthened by significant 'self-support,' and the 
claim is weakened by the absence of such." How can Alston turn 
to self-support, since he has rejected epistemically circular consid­
erations? There are, he says, different sorts of self-support. The 
sort of self-support in which the same belief is used both as tester 
and testee is too easy and provides only trivial results. Not all 
kinds of self-support are so trivial: 
Consider the following ways in which SPP [sense perceptual doxas­
tic practice] supports its own claims. (r) By engaging in SPP and 
allied memory and inferential practices we are enabled to make pre­
dictions, many of which turn out to be correct, and thereby we 
are able to anticipate and control, to some considerable extent, the 
course of events. (2) By relying on SPP and associated practices we 
are able to establish facts about the operations of sense perception 
that show both that it is a reliable source of belief and why it is 
reliable. These results are by no means trivial. It can not be taken for 
granted that any practice whatever will yield comparable fruits. It is 
quite conceivable that we should not have attained this kind or de­
gree of success at prediction and control by relying on the output of 
SPP; and it is equally conceivable that this output should not have 
put us in a position to acquire sufficient understanding of the work­
ings of perception to see why it can be relied on. To be sure, an 
8. Ibid., p. 17. 
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argument from these fruits to the reliability of SPP is still infected 
with epistemic circularity; apart from reliance on SPP we have no 
way of knowing the outcome of our attempts at prediction and con­
trol, and no way of confirming our suppositions about the workings 
of perception. Nevertheless, this is not the trivial epistemically cir­
cular support that necessarily extends to every practice. Many prac­
tices can not show anything analogous; crystal ball gazing and the 
reading of entrails cannot. Since SPP supports itself in ways it con­
ceivably might not, and in ways other practices do not, its prima 
facie claims to acceptance are thereby strengthened; and if crystal ball 
gazing lacks any non-trivial support, its claims suffer by compari­
son.• 
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This does not mean that we should expect all practices to be self­
supported in the SPP way, for example, by predictive capabilities. 
Such requirements are neither necessary nor important for other 
practices. But we can and should look at other practices to consider 
their fruits and whether they are appropriate to the aims of those 
practices. The basic point is, however, that practices may or may 
not have self-support of this epistemically circular but nontrivial 
sort and thereby be strengthened or weakened from the point of 
view of their overall rationality. 
Alston closes the essay by considering the relationship between 
rationality as he construes it and the original issues of reliability 
and justification. As it turns out, the prima facie rationality of en­
gaging in a practice entails neither the reliability of the practice nor 
a justification for a belief in its reliability. This is true, in part at 
least, because the notion of justification cum reliability is an "ob­
jectivist " notion whereas the notion of rationality is an "subjec­
tivist " one, the former applying to beliefs, the latter applying to 
practices. Why the distinction? 
The short story is this. I have tried to be objectivist as long as possi­
ble. But the difficulties in establishing justification (rationality) for 
beliefs in an objectivist sense drives us (sooner or later, and why 
make it any later? ) to appeal to an internalist rationality for prac­
tices. If one still wonders why we couldn't have used an internalist 
conception of justification for beliefs in the first place . . . 
. . . the answer is quite simple. So long as we consider beliefs in 
9. Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
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isolation, we have no sufficient basis for an internalist judgment of 
rationality . . . .  We come onto something really helpful only when 
we take the mode of belief-formation concretely, as an aspect of a 
practice that is socially established and that plays a central role in 
human life. Then, and only then, do we find reasons for a judgment 
that it is reasonable to engage in the practice. 
What then is the connection between the rationality of a practice 
and its reliability? "To accept some doxastic practice . . .  as rational 
is to judge that it is rational to take it as a way of finding out what 
(some aspect of) the world is like; it is to judge that to form beliefs 
in accordance with this practice is to reflect the character of some 
stretch of reality. " This move does not imply an entailment of re­
liability by rationality. But logical entailment is not the only kind. 
There is pragmatic implication, for example, such as that found in 
belief; in believing p one is taking p to be true. But the belief in p 
does not entail p's truth, and neither does rationality entail re­
liability. Nevertheless, judging a practice to be rational seems to 
imply that one soundly judges it to be reliable and also that one 
soundly judges it to be justifiably engaged in. 10 
2. Alstonian Justification Old and New Once More 
How are Alston's various versions of justification and rationality 
related? We have seen some relations. My interest, however, is in 
connecting the conclusions of" A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach" to 
the two versions of the parity thesis I have suggested. One way 
to approach this task is to ask how Alston's notion of rationality 
is related to the notions of Jns and Jnw as originally construed in 
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief. " Alston's original intu­
itions were to suggest that Jnw is the best we can do from the epi­
stemic point of view, since Je is out of reach. This leaves us with 
only a prima facie notion of justification. As we have seen, later he 
argues that ]eg is possibly attainable and that in fact it is the most 
desirable from the epistemic point of view. Later yet, he suggests 
that, although we may have the better kind of epistemic justifica­
tion, full reflective justification is not possible. This leaves us with 
a notion of rationality spelled out in terms of what is prima facie. 
IO. Ibid., pp. 2 1-2]. 
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Perhaps Alston's shift to the doxastic practice approach is con­
nected to his original intuition-that Je is not within our reach, or 
at least not fully so. Because Alston shifts ground when moving 
from justification to rationality, we end up not with ]eg plain and 
simple but ]eg understood through the doxastic practice approach 
that in turn leaves us with prima facie judgments as to the J� of a 
practice and thus the ]eg of its deliverances. 
In the previous chapter I noted that much of our interest in PTA 
derives from the supposition that both PP and CP are only Jnw· 
Since it looks as if PP is capable of being more strongly supported 
(from the epistemic point of view) than CP-for example, to the 
level of J� rather than just Jn-PTA is not so interesting. We want 
something more than prima facie justification if we can get it, so 
PT AS comes out as worthy of consideration. But now that we 
know that J� must be, so to speak, filtered through a doxastic 
practice approach, should we not recast Alston's parity thesis in 
terms of prima facie rationality? Since, according to Alston, all 
epistemic or doxastic practices can be shown to be reliable (using 
the trivial methodology he suggests and the assumption it makes), 
the interesting claim that a practice is reliable is disabled; no sorting 
among practices seems epistemically promising. The move to the 
question of rationality resurrects the possibility of sorting among 
practices. Although a judgment that it is rational to engage in a 
practice includes a sound judgment that the practice is reliable, the 
former entails neither that the practice is reliable nor our needing to 
show that the practice is reliable. 
Given this suggestion, a new parity thesis emerges: 
Parity Thesis'tston (PT:x): Under appropriate conditions, 
both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are prima 
facie rational. 
Understood in this way, Alston's parity thesis avoids the problems 
presented above but once again needs evaluation. Is it true? 
The first thing to note is that PTX does not fall prey to the 
charge that CP lacks indicators of reliability whereas PP does not, 
where this is taken to show that one is rational whereas the other is 
not. This charge is not successful against PTX for the reasons Al­
ston develops in defending CP's Jnw in "Christian Experience and 
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Christian Belief." Unlike PTAs• where positive reasons are needed 
to show reliability, prima facie rationality and Jnw are explained in 
terms of negative conditions, namely, that a practice is prima facie 
rationally engaged in (or Jnw) unless there are reasons not to take it 
as rational (or justified). So a lack of confirmation or, for that mat­
ter, a lack of any indicator of reliability does not remove the prima 
facie rationality needed for PTl 
But what Alston says does allow for various levels of strength of 
rationality beyond the prima facie when he points to various kinds 
of self-support for an epistemic practice. Significant self-support 
adds to the overall rationality of engaging in a practice. The trivial 
testee-tester type of self-support cannot help us distinguish among 
various strengths of rationality, for such support is, says Alston, 
available for all doxastic practices. But other kinds of self-support 
are not. For example, the predictability engendered by SPP, its 
usefulness in anticipating and controlling the course of events, and 
the fact that we can use SPP to understand how it operates provide 
self-support of a kind that not every practice has. Crystal ball gaz­
ing and the reading of entrails have neither these features nor any­
thing analogous. Since SPP supports itself in ways it might not 
have, and in ways that other practices do not, its claims to ratio­
nality are stronger than they might otherwise have been. 
But there is an important warning to consider here:· 
We must be careful not to take up another chauvinistic stance, that 
of supposing that a practice can be non-trivially self-supported only 
in the SPP way. The acceptability of rational intuition or deductive 
reasoning is not weakened by the fact that reliance on the outputs of 
these practices does not lead to achievements in prediction and con­
trol. The point is that they are, by their very nature, unsuitable for 
this use; they are not "designed" to give us information that could 
serve as the basis for such results. Since they do not purport to 
provide information about the physical environment, it would be 
unreasonable in the extreme to condemn them for not providing us 
with an evidential basis for predictive hypotheses. Similarly, I have 
argued in . . .  ["Christian Experience and Christian Belief'] that it is 
equally inappropriate to expect predictive efficacy from the practice 
of forming beliefs about God on the basis of religious experience, 
and equally misguided to consider the claims of that practice to be 
weakened by its failure to contribute to achievements of this ilk. On 
the other hand, we can consider whether these other practices yield 
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fruits that are appropriate to their character and aims. And it would 
seem that the combination of rational intuition and deduction yields 
impressive and fairly stable abstract systems, while the religious ex­
periential practice mentioned earlier provides effective guidance to 
spiritual development." 
The lack of predictive efficacy of a practice does not show that 
the practice is unreliable. And we must not expect all practices to 
have the kind of nontrivial self-support that separates the non­
trivially supported from the trivially supported in terms of ratio­
nality. Nor must we expect all kinds of nontrivial self-support to 
be alike. There are then at least two classes of doxastic practices: 
those that are trivially supported (all practices fall into this class) 
and those that have additional, nontrivial support (a subclass of the 
larger). 
[ 99 
Can the differences among the nontrivial kinds of self-support 
allow us to divide the subclass into further subclasses in terms of 
strength of overall rationality? Perhaps, but Alston suggests no 
way to do this. In fact, one might make the following argument 
against such an adjudication. Since it is not the case that the result 
of SPP (its help in our getting around in the physical world) is 
epistemically superior to results of other practices (the building of 
stable abstract systems or spiritual development), how could one 
adjudicate between them? These goals and results are not epistemic 
but practical, and on that point the goals and results of each prac­
tice may simply be different. When the practices work well they 
are self-supported in a way that distances them from those that do 
not work well-those that are merely trivially self-supported-and 
thus strengthened in their claim to rationality. But once moved 
into the inner circle of nontrivially self-supported practices, further 
adjudication on epistemic grounds seems unlikely. For the goals 
and results are internal, as is the judgment that those goals are met 
by the results. It is the internal nature of the judgment that appar­
ently disallows epistemic comparison of the winning practices. 
Thus it seems unlikely that one can successfully make out an argu­
ment that PP is more strongly nontrivially self-supported than CP 
on epistemic grounds. A challenge to PT� based on that approach 
does not seem to have a high likelihood of success. 
I I. Ibid.' p. 19. 
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But this argument needs to contend with two issues. First is the 
issue of evaluating CP and PP in terms of the closeness of the cog­
nitive connection between the experiences and the beliefs generated 
by the practices. Recall that CP and PP seem to differ on whether 
they are conceptual-reading practices or noninferential mediated 
practices. I argued that PP is the former, CP the latter, and that 
Alston needs to refine further the notion of Jnw· Taking prima facie 
rationality and its connections to epistemic justification and re­
liability as further refinements of the general idea behind Jnw• or at 
least of Alston's initial intuition that Jnw is the best we can do epi­
stemically, perhaps it can be suggested that there are levels of 
strength within the winning circle of epistemic practices. Would 
such adjudication among levels be an epistemic adjudication? I be­
lieve so, but I postpone the detailed argument for this point until 
Chapter 8. 
Second, if, as Alston says, the features of predictability, univer­
sal engagement, and like conceptual schemes are "desiderata for an 
epistemic practice " from a cognitive point of view, then PP is su­
perior in that way to CP and to all other practices that fail to have 
those features, by his own admission. 12 Of course, that things "go 
more smoothly, more satisfyingly, " from the cognitive point of 
view when certain features are present does not in itself show that a 
practice with those features is reliable. On this point Alston seems 
quite correct. But it does show, on Alston's terms, that a practice 
failing to have those features, or analogous features, does not have 
as strong a rational claim. This is indicated by Alston's unwilling­
ness to accept those doxastic practices that are idiosyncratic or not 
socially accepted, such as Cedric's sun-dried tomato approach to 
the stock market or the use of entrails for teaching us about politi­
cal events. These idiosyncratic practices lack the significant self­
support of the predictable SPP, for example. 
But can we rank practices within the subclass of the nontrivially 
self-supported by kinds of self-support? We can, given Alston's 
admission that, "if we were shaping the world to our heart's de­
sire, I dare say that we would arrange for our practices to exhibit 
these features [e. g. , predictive power, universal engagement, and 
12. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," pp. 123-24, for 
details. 
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so forth]," after which he goes on to argue that CP and PP are 
both Jnw even though the former lacks the features whose presence would 
increase its cognitive attractiveness. 13 But this ranking is done from the 
cognitive point of view, and one wonders what cognition has to 
do with epistemic justification. Being cognitively more satisfying 
does not provide evidence of reliability and hence does not provide 
evidence of justification either. Perhaps the best we can say is that 
the cognitive attractiveness influences only one's rational engage­
ment in a practice. And, as Alston argues, rationality and justifica­
tion are not the same thing. But that cognitive attractiveness influ­
ences the rational acceptance of a practice does at least indicate our 
preference for certain kinds of practice over others (e. g. , predictive 
practices over nonpredictive), and accordingly we can rank prac­
tices in terms of their desirability from a rational-cognitive point of 
view. The more desirable a practice is from the cognitive point of 
view, the more rational it is to engage in that practice. This point 
links to the first issue, for surely it is more desirable from the cog­
nitive point of view to have our beliefs closely read off our experi­
ences; the distinction between conceptual-reading and noninfer­
ential mediated practices becomes important at precisely this 
juncture. Insofar as a practice puts our beliefs more directly in 
touch with the experiences that generate them than not (that is, 
insofar as a practice is a conceptual-reading practice rather than a 
noninferential mediated practice), it is more rational to engage in 
that practice. 
Is there a direct connection between the nontrivial self-support 
to which Alston points (predictive power or spiritual formative 
power) and conceptual-reading versus noninferential mediated 
practices? If being conceptually read is more cognitively satisfying 
than being noninferentially mediated, then one might suggest that 
only practices that are the former are also predictive or universally 
engaged in. But this is not the case, since there are epistemic prac­
tices that seem to be neither conceptually read nor predictive, 
for example, pure mathematics. Pure mathematics, it would seem, 
should rank fairly high in terms of our rational engagement 
therein. Nevertheless, just as we would construct the world, if we 
could, in such a way that our experiential epistemic practices had 
IJ. Ibid., p. 124. 
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the features of predictability, universal engagement, and so forth, 
so we would construct the world such that our experientially based 
practices were of the conceptual-reading sort. Such a world is more 
desirable from the cognitive point of view. That we have such a 
wish allows for a ranking of strengths of rationality on the simple 
ground that one practice more immediately connects the beliefs it 
generates to the experiences on which it rests than others. 
Thus the ranking of practices from within the subclass of ratio­
nal practices is quite complex. It involves ranking certain features 
dealing with the internal goals of a practice to its deliverances (e. g. , 
does the practice aim to be predictive and is it? vs. does the practice 
aim to develop its participants's spiritual formation and does it?). 
But it also involves sortings on the basis of whether a practice 
is experientially based (pure mathematics vs. PP or CP) as well as 
rankings among experientially based practices in terms of how 
closely connected the beliefs it delivers are to the experiences that 
generate those beliefs. This last ranking seems to involve a signifi­
cant epistemic aspect, for the noninferential mediated generation of 
beliefs involves other background beliefs that stand in need of epi­
stemic justification, an issue to which I return in Chapters 7 and 8. 
What does all this have to do with PT�? I am suggesting that 
one can rank practices within the subclass of the nontrivially self­
supported from a cognitive point of view and that, although some 
practices rank higher than others, this does not show that the lower 
are not prima facie rational. But then even though PT� may be 
true, it stands in need of further refinement, just as PTA does. Al­
though it is interesting that CP and PP are both prima facie ratio­
nal, if there are further levels of strength of rationality to which we 
have access, then we ought to consider those. Although PP and CP 
may have the same kind of rationality-PP with its predictive self­
support and CP with its spiritual development self-support-the 
former has a stronger level of self support; PP is a conceptual­
reading practice and CP is only a noninferential mediated practice. 
As such, the former ranks more highly in terms of its overall ratio­
nality. Thus although PT� is, left without refinement, true, a 
closer analysis indicates that PP and CP do not have the same level 
of rational strength beyond the prima facie level, and a more cir­
cumspect statement of the parity thesis needs to indicate that dif­
ference in level. 
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The original thought behind the parity thesis was that PP and 
CP have the same kind and level of epistemic justification. Alston's 
epistemology seems to indicate that ultimate judgments of re­
liability, and hence justification, can only be done (in any helpful 
way) from the point of view of rationality.14 Does PT'X fulfill the 
original aims of Alston's project in comparing religious and non­
religious beliefs and practices? Insofar as one's judgment that one's 
engaging in a practice is rational is a judgment that one's engaging 
in it is justified and that the practice is reliable, then yes it does. 
And perhaps that is the best we can do-a sort of meta­
epistemological thesis that CP and PP are on a par. But even un­
derstood in metaepistemological terms, PT'X stands in need of fur­
ther refinement because of the various strengths of the claims to 
rationality beyond the merely prima facie level. 
In this and the previous several chapters I have argued that Al­
ston's initial parity thesis stands in need of further clarification and 
that a stronger version based on his later work is not true. In 
Chapter 2 I raised difficulties based on distinctions between nonin­
ferential mediated belief formation and conceptual-reading belief 
formation. Applying those distinctions, I have suggested that, al­
though noninferential mediated beliefs (or practices) and concep­
tual-reading beliefs (or practices) might be Jnw• the former are not 
as strongly justified as the latter. The distinction on which that 
argument rests was uncovered by considering the problems of 
identifying individuals. Such identifications require, following the 
background belief challenge, a special role for background beliefs 
(beyond mere concepts) in the generation of beliefs about spatio­
temporally nonrooted individuals. The failure of the stronger ver­
sion of the parity thesis (PT As) rests on a lack of inductive evidence 
for the claim that CP is reliable. This lack of evidence is traceable 
in part to a lack of regularity and predictability of the object the 
beliefs are about and hence a lack of confirmation for the deliv­
erances of CP. But a further account of the parity thesis (PT'X) is 
developed in which the emphasis is shifted from epistemic justifica­
tion to prima facie rationality. Here too there are various rankings 
14. Internal judgments of reliability can be made within the practice on the basis 
of evidence. 
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beyond the prima facie one can give to practices and thus, although 
PT'X is more refined than PT A• it still needs to include a reference 
to the various ways a practice may be ranked. Once that is done, 
CP and PP, although both minimally prima facie rational, can also 
be shown to have different levels of strength beyond the prima 
facie. But we are primarily interested in the account of the stron­
gest kind and level of rationality (cum justification) we can have, 
and we therefore want the parity thesis to reflect that strength. 
Since CP and PP can apparently be ranked beyond the prima facie 
level, and they turn out, if my argument is correct, to have differ­
ent levels of strength beyond the prima facie, PT'X is the strongest 
parity thesis we can have. Stronger versions turn out to be false. In 
short, PT'X, like PT A• does not reflect what more can be said. It is 
misleading in a certain way-leaving us, perhaps, with the false 
confidence that since both PP and CP have prima facie rationality 
they are equal in epistemic strength. They are not. 
